Treaty Breaking in Islamic History
Throughout Islamic history, a disturbing pattern emerges: treaties with non-Muslims are kept when Muslims are weak, broken when Muslims become strong. This isn't coincidental bad behavior by individual Muslims; it's rooted in Islamic teaching and modeled by Muhammad himself. Understanding this pattern is essential for anyone evaluating Islam's claims about peace and for anyone negotiating with Islamic regimes today.
The Pattern Established: The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah
The foundational example of treaty-breaking in Islam is Muhammad's Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (628 CE). This treaty between Muhammad and the Quraysh of Mecca established a ten-year truce and included several provisions:
- Muslims would return to Medina without performing pilgrimage that year
- Muslims could return the following year for pilgrimage
- Any person from Mecca who went to Muhammad without guardian permission must be returned
- Any Muslim who went to Mecca would not be returned
- Arab tribes were free to ally with either side
- The treaty would last ten years
Many Muslims were outraged by these terms, seeing them as humiliating. However, Muhammad signed the treaty. Islamic tradition presents this as a strategic masterstroke—a temporary peace that allowed Islam to consolidate power.
Two years later, Muhammad broke the treaty and conquered Mecca. The justification? A minor skirmish between tribes allied with each side. But the historical evidence suggests Muhammad was simply waiting until he had sufficient military strength to break the treaty advantageously.
Ibn Ishaq's biography of Muhammad (Sirat Rasul Allah) records:
"The Apostle had already made up his mind to march on Mecca... He ordered preparations to be made and kept the matter a close secret." (Ibn Ishaq, p. 544)
This wasn't a reluctant defensive response to treaty violation; it was a calculated offensive campaign planned in secret.
The Quranic Justification
The Quran provides theological justification for breaking treaties when circumstances favor Muslims:
"If you [have reason to] fear from a people betrayal, throw [their treaty] back to them, [putting you] on equal terms. Indeed, Allah does not like traitors." (Quran 8:58)
Notice the subjective standard: "if you fear betrayal." You don't need actual betrayal, just fear of potential future betrayal. This gives Muslims wide latitude to break treaties when it serves Islamic interests, while technically claiming justification.
"And if they incline to peace, then incline to it [also] and rely upon Allah. Indeed, it is He who is the Hearing, the Knowing. But if they intend to deceive you - then sufficient for you is Allah." (Quran 8:61-62)
This passage encourages peace when the other party wants it, but immediately warns that they might be trying to deceive you—providing justification for suspicion and preemptive treaty-breaking.
More directly:
"[So] fulfill the treaty with them to the end of their term, for God loves those who are mindful of Him. But once the Sacred Months have passed, kill the polytheists wherever you find them, capture them, besiege them, and lie in wait for them on every route." (Quran 9:4-5)
Treaties should be kept only "to the end of their term"—and even then, once certain temporal restrictions pass, violence should resume. This establishes treaties not as permanent peace but as temporary truces until Islam is strong enough to resume conquest.
Islamic Jurisprudence on Treaties
Classical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) developed detailed rulings on treaties with non-Muslims, establishing that:
1. Treaties are Temporary: No treaty with non-Muslims should exceed ten years (following the Hudaybiyyah model). Some scholars permit shorter periods; none permit permanent peace.
2. Treaties are Conditional: Treaties may be broken when Muslims become strong enough to prevail, when the non-Muslims are perceived to have violated terms (even minor infractions), or when continuing the treaty no longer serves Islamic interests.
3. Treaties are Tactical: The purpose of treaties is to give Muslims time to consolidate power, not to establish lasting peace. This is explicitly stated in classical texts.
Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri in Reliance of the Traveller (a classical manual of Islamic law):
"The caliph makes war upon Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians... until they become Muslim or pay the non-Muslim poll tax." (o9.8)
"If the caliph makes a truce with an enemy for a specified period, it is only permissible out of necessity, such as when the Muslims are weak." (o9.16)
Notice: treaties are permitted "only out of necessity" when "Muslims are weak." When Muslims are strong, jihad should continue until non-Muslims submit.
Historical Examples of Treaty-Breaking
The Banu Qaynuqa (624 CE): Muhammad had a treaty with this Jewish tribe in Medina. After the Battle of Badr, when Muhammad's position strengthened, he besieged them, exiled them, and confiscated their property. The justification was a minor market dispute.
The Banu Nadir (625 CE): Another Jewish tribe with whom Muhammad had a treaty. Muhammad accused them of plotting to kill him (with no clear evidence), besieged them, expelled them, and took their land.
The Banu Qurayza (627 CE): Muhammad accused this Jewish tribe of aiding his enemies during the Battle of the Trench. After the battle, he besieged them, forced their surrender, and oversaw the execution of 600-900 men and the enslavement of women and children.
In each case, Muhammad had treaties or agreements with these tribes, and in each case, he found justification to break those agreements once his position strengthened.
Khaybar (628 CE): Immediately after signing the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (supposedly establishing peace), Muhammad attacked the Jewish settlement of Khaybar. The treaty with the Quraysh apparently didn't imply general peace with non-Muslims.
Modern Examples
This pattern continues in modern Islamic history:
The PLO and Israel: Yasser Arafat signed the Oslo Accords with Israel in 1993, establishing a framework for peace. Shortly after signing, Arafat gave a speech in a Johannesburg mosque comparing the Oslo Accords to the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah—signaling to Muslims that he viewed it as a temporary truce until conditions favored Palestinians to resume conflict.
Egypt and Israel: Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. While the formal treaty has held, Egypt's state media, mosques, and educational system continue to promote anti-Israeli and antisemitic propaganda, and Egyptian officials regularly threaten to review the treaty when politically convenient.
Iran and the Nuclear Deal: Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, agreeing to restrict nuclear development. Throughout the agreement period, evidence emerged of continued nuclear research, and Iran's leaders publicly stated they viewed the agreement as temporary.
Taliban and the U.S.: The Taliban signed the Doha Agreement with the United States in 2020, agreeing to prevent terrorism and negotiate with the Afghan government. Within months of the U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban had broken virtually every commitment, seized power militarily, and established strict Islamic rule.
The Strategic Doctrine
What Westerners often misunderstand is that from an Islamic jurisprudential perspective, these aren't violations of ethics—they're applications of a coherent strategic doctrine:
- When Muslims are weak: Make peace, build strength, appear moderate
- When Muslims are strong: Resume jihad, break treaties when advantageous, establish Islamic rule
This isn't hypocrisy to many Muslims; it's following Muhammad's example and applying principles found in Islamic texts.
The Problem for Negotiations
This creates a serious problem for anyone negotiating with Islamic regimes or movements:
1. How do you trust a treaty when Islamic law teaches it's only binding while Muslims are weak?
2. How do you interpret "moderate" statements when taqiyya (deception) and temporary treaties are religiously sanctioned?
3. How do you build lasting peace when Islamic eschatology envisions ultimate Muslim dominance, making permanent peace with non-Muslims theoretically impossible?
Western negotiators typically assume all parties view treaties as binding agreements meant to establish lasting peace. But if one party views treaties as temporary truces to be broken when advantageous, the negotiation is fundamentally unequal.
The Dar al-Harb vs. Dar al-Islam Framework
Classical Islamic jurisprudence divides the world into two realms:
Dar al-Islam (House of Islam): Territories under Islamic rule where sharia is enforced.
Dar al-Harb (House of War): Non-Muslim territories that are, by definition, in a state of war with Islam until they submit.
Some scholars add a third category:
Dar al-Sulh (House of Treaty): Non-Muslim territories that have treaties with Muslims, granting them temporary peace.
The key word is temporary. The ultimate goal is for all Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Sulh to become Dar al-Islam. Treaties are tools in that process, not permanent resolutions.
The Exception That Proves the Rule
Muslim apologists sometimes point to Muslim leaders who kept treaties or showed tolerance. These examples exist, but they're typically:
- Situations where Muslims were weak and needed peace
- Pragmatic rulers who prioritized stability over strict Islamic law
- Exceptions that Muslim reformers cite while being criticized by orthodox scholars
The fact that keeping treaties with non-Muslims is seen as exceptional or requiring special justification reveals the underlying expectation.
Biblical Contrast: Covenant Faithfulness
The biblical perspective on treaties and covenants is fundamentally different:
"If you make a vow to the Lord your God, do not be slow to pay it, for the Lord your God will certainly demand it of you and you will be guilty of sin." (Deuteronomy 23:21)
"Lord, who may dwell in your sacred tent? Who may live on your holy mountain? The one whose walk is blameless, who does what is righteous, who speaks the truth from their heart... who keeps an oath even when it hurts, and does not change their mind." (Psalm 15:1-2, 4)
The standard is keeping oaths "even when it hurts"—precisely the opposite of breaking them when circumstances change.
When Joshua made a treaty with the Gibeonites through deception (they pretended to be from a distant land), he kept the treaty even after discovering the deception, because he had sworn an oath before the Lord (Joshua 9). The Israelites later faced divine judgment when Saul violated this treaty (2 Samuel 21).
God himself is presented as absolutely faithful to his covenants:
"God is not human, that he should lie, not a human being, that he should change his mind. Does he speak and then not act? Does he promise and not fulfill?" (Numbers 23:19)
"If we are faithless, he remains faithful, for he cannot disown himself." (2 Timothy 2:13)
The biblical God's character is defined by covenant faithfulness, not strategic treaty-breaking.
Questions to Consider
- If Muhammad broke the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah after only two years of a ten-year agreement, what does this teach Muslims about keeping agreements with non-Muslims?
- How can lasting peace be achieved when Islamic jurisprudence teaches that treaties with non-Muslims should be temporary and broken when Muslims become strong?
- Why would the Quran's standard for breaking treaties be subjective ("if you fear betrayal") rather than requiring actual betrayal?
- If classical Islamic law explicitly states treaties are "only permissible out of necessity, such as when the Muslims are weak," how should non-Muslims interpret peace offers from Islamic regimes?
- Does the pattern of Muhammad making peace with tribes when weak and breaking treaties when strong suggest divine guidance or strategic opportunism?
- How should Western negotiators approach agreements with Islamic states when Islamic law may view those agreements as temporary truces rather than permanent peace?
- If Yasser Arafat compared the Oslo Accords to the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (which Muhammad broke), what was he signaling about his intentions?
- Can a religion that teaches its ultimate goal is worldwide Islamic rule ever make permanent peace with non-Muslim nations, or only temporary truces?